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The United States is safer after the death of Osama bin Laden for three reasons: 1) its effect on our 
enemies; 2) its effect on our relationship with Pakistan; 3) and its effect on the rising generation of 
young men—mostly Muslim and Arab—who might otherwise have been vulnerable to bin Laden’s 
ideology. 
First, the skill with which the Abbottabad operation was carried out sent the strongest possible 
signal to our enemies that they can find no true sanctuary and that their lives can and will be ended 
at a time of our choosing.  The success of our predator drone campaign in the Afghanistan/Pakistan 
border region, and elsewhere, over the last few years has sent a similar message, as have the many 
special operations missions which have eliminated other al Qaeda operatives. The death of Osama 
bin Laden, however, was the culmination of these efforts for a variety of reasons—not the least of 
which is his talismanic status as the United States’ great nemesis.  The Abbottabad operation 
demonstrated that no matter the enemy’s resources, capabilities, or security measures; the United 
States will not tire of pursuit and will inevitably prevail.  If other enemies of the United States ever 
doubted our strategic resolve or tactical ability, they cannot in the aftermath of Osama bin Laden’s 
death.  The resources and efforts our enemies must spend on their own security going forward 
cannot but enhance our national security, if only because we have more time to discover and disrupt 
their schemes.  An optimist might even say that the audacity and precision on display in the 
Abbottabad operation will, for some time, dissuade our most capable, and therefore most 
dangerous, enemies from even planning plots against the United States.  The benefit to national 
security in that case is obvious and inestimable. 
Likewise, the intelligence gathered as a result of the Abbottabad operation—computer hard drives 
describing and chronicling significant aspects of al Qaeda’s operations, by all accounts—is of terrific 
importance.  The exact contents of bin Laden’s computers are highly classified and not widely 
known.  But it seems certain “that bin Laden had remained far more involved in the operational 
activities of al Qaeda than many American officials had thought. He had been developing plans to 
assassinate Obama and Petraeus, to pull off an extravagant September 11th anniversary attack, and 
to attack American trains.” 118   Obviously, disrupting high profile plots such as these is of 
tremendous value to our national security—as valuable as the idea that we now have crucial, top-
level information about al Qaeda.  No less than the example of resilience and expertise set by the 
Navy SEALs in Abbottabad, the idea that the United States may now know the most intimate details 
of al Qaeda’s operations significantly degrades the ability of terrorists to attack the United States.  
How can terrorists be sure we are not watching?  How can they trust their own security measures?  
They cannot.  More importantly, they must know they cannot.  This situation, in which al Qaeda and 
enemies of the United States sympathetic to it cannot have confidence in the security of their 
operations, immeasurably enhances the safety of the United States. 
The second reason the death of Osama bin Laden has made the United States safer relates to 
Pakistan.  Our misalliance with Pakistan is murky and fraught, and the Abbottabad operation has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Nicholas Schmidle, “Getting Bin Laden”, The New Yorker, August 8, 2011: 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/08/08/110808fa_fact_schmidle (last accessed August 6, 2011) 
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brought a long overdue reckoning.  The exact reason why elements within Pakistan’s national 
security establishment allegedly protected and supported Osama bin Laden may not be widely 
known, but the overall strategic logic is not difficult to understand.  Osama bin Laden’s presence in 
Pakistan, under the control of some element of Pakistan’s security establishment, was an insurance 
policy.  If the United States ever completely abandoned Afghanistan or otherwise fundamentally 
reconsidered its relationship with Pakistan—both constant concerns in Islamabad—Osama bin 
Laden, alive and well, would have provided Pakistan with a range of strategic options.   
Regarding Afghanistan, it is reasonable for Pakistan to assume that, in the event of yet another 
American abandonment of its neighbor to the west, the Taliban, or some other jihadist faction, 
would come to power.  In that case, the hospitality Pakistan had shown to the Taliban’s erstwhile 
guest, and jihadist hero, would undoubtedly have been rewarded, and would have allowed Pakistan 
to maintain its historical influence in Afghanistan.  
Regarding India, Pakistan’s original and seemingly eternal enemy, patronage of Osama bin Laden 
enhanced Pakistan’s leverage. Much to Pakistan’s chagrin, strategic cooperation between the United 
States and India has become ever more forthright over the last several years. Indeed, many experts 
contend that India is the United States’ most natural and most capable ally in South Asia. “The 
ascent of China and the hedging this now produces across Asia helps focus the United States and 
India on their shared interest in an Asian balance of power. The values aspect, too, is real; a younger 
generation of Indian officials sees the world through less traditional eyes, and the government quite 
deliberately now refers to itself as the ‘world's largest democracy.’ There is bipartisan support on 
both sides for a close strategic relationship, and private sector support for better economic ties.”119  
Pakistan may go unmentioned in this analysis, but Pakistan cannot ignore deepening ties between 
the United States and India.     
Given the bloody history of Pakistan and India, a strong Indo-American alliance is likely a terrifying 
prospect for the Pakistani national security establishment.  Osama bin Laden in-residence just two 
hours’ drive from Islamabad gave Pakistan two options—one stick, one carrot—to blunt the effects 
of ever closer United States-India cooperation.  The stick: under suitable circumstances, bin Laden 
could have been operationalized in order to remind the United States of the costs of alienating 
Pakistan.  Lashkar-e-Taiba’s 2008 rampage in Mumbai at a minimum proves that spectacular 
terrorist attacks can emanate from Pakistan.  The carrot: again under suitable circumstances, bin 
Laden could have been presented as a gift to the United States.  “Capturing” bin Laden in this 
manner would have burnished Pakistan’s anti-terror credentials, bought international goodwill, and 
put the United States in Pakistan’s debt.   In either case, harboring Osama bin Laden improved 
Pakistan’s strategic position vis-à-vis the United States, Afghanistan, and India and was therefore 
perfectly understandable.  From the United States’ perspective, however, it was intolerable.   
The United States is determined to remain on the best possible terms with Pakistan.  The fight 
against terrorism, stability in South Asia and the Middle East, success in Afghanistan, and nuclear 
security demand no less.  But such ties cannot depend on the judgment of the most cynical and 
reactionary elements of Pakistan’s national security establishment. This description almost certainly 
fits those who harbored Osama bin Laden, as Pakistan’s sullen and confused reaction to the 
Abbottabad operation attests.  Eliminating bin Laden has enhanced our national security because it 	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has eliminated a great strategic vulnerability we had vis-à-vis Pakistan.  Furthermore, there is every 
reason to suppose that the Abbottabad operation will discredit and marginalize Pakistani officials 
sympathetic with radicals like bin Laden, and who may have been responsible for his sanctuary.  If 
their influence wanes and allows for less cynical and paranoid officials to lead Pakistan, our tense 
relations with Pakistan will undoubtedly improve.  A stable relationship with Pakistan and deeper 
cooperation with India are crucial to United States interests in South Asia and to our broader 
strategic interests worldwide. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly in the long run, the effect bin Laden’s death must have on a 
generation of young men now coming to maturity—many of whom have seen their fathers and 
cousins and brothers respond to bin Laden’s summons in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere—cannot 
be overestimated.  To the eyes of these men, Osama bin Laden’s was no heroic death fitting of a 
martyr to the faith.  Rather, bin Laden met a cowering end at the hands of a much more capable 
enemy.  The one-time guru of anti-American jihadism had clearly been reduced to what journalist 
Christopher Hitchens describes as “the pathetic client of a ramshackle regime.”  Osama bin Laden 
was no Saladin.  He was not even a Muhammad bin Qasim.  He will be a footnote in Islamic military 
history, most likely as a cautionary tale, and certainly no hero.  Young men in the Muslim world who 
have been intently assessing the wages of war against the United States since boyhood know this 
better than anyone else. 
One of Osama bin Laden’s observations is likely to last for generations to come however: people 
will follow the strong horse over the weak horse.  Osama bin Laden’s misspent life and squalid 
death revealed him as an Arabian plodder, not even a Sham.120 
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